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Governance: The Lessons of ‘Golden Rice’ in India1 
Doris Fuchs and Katharina Glaab 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Sustainability aspects of the agrifood system play a pivotal role in today’s global 
governance at all levels of decision-making. Questions of food security and food safety, 
biodiversity or the fate of local practices and values reflect some of the sources of 
potential conflict between states, as well as between business, state, and civil society 
actors. This special section aims to investigate the interaction of global and local forces in 
shaping the sustainability of the agrifood system. The section chooses India as the setting 
in which to investigate the interaction between global and local forces due to the crucial 
role the food demand and supply of this rising power plays in today’s agrifood system. 
This article provides the special sections’ analytical framework, which uses the interplay 
of material and ideational dimensions of power as a focal lens. In addition, the article 
applies this framework to an empirical study of the political conflict around GMO foods 
in India, specifically the case of ‘Golden Rice’. 
 
                                                 
1
 Under Review at Food Policy. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the major problems in the global agrifood system is its lack of sustainability. Global food 
security and safety are still distant goals. In 2009, 1020 million people were suffering from 
hunger and 6 million people were likely to have died from malnourishment according to FAO 
(FAO 2009). At the same time, even those who have enough to eat face health threats from 
unsafe food production methods, and today’s agricultural practices are associated with 
biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas emissions, and soil erosion and degradation to name just a few 
of the relevant environmental problems.  
Yet, the sustainability of today’s global agrifood system is shaped by a complex web of forces. 
The liberalization and globalization of agriculture and food-chains have influenced the 
organizational structure of the system, actor constellations and interaction within. The resulting 
picture is an intricate and multifaceted power play, where global and local forces interact and 
state as well as non-state actors are both able to take agency. At the same time, a variety of 
norms such as sustainability, efficiency and modernity play a pivotal role in agrifood 
governance. Importantly, the influence and ability of different global and local forces to exercise 
power may differ considerably according to the sources of their power as well as structural 
constraints. Not surprisingly then, a systematic analysis of the interaction of global and local 
forces, their sources of power, and their impact on the sustainability of the agrifood system is 
still lacking. Yet, we urgently need to identify the most powerful determinants of the 
sustainability characteristics of global agrifood production and consumption. In particular, we 
must ask how global and local forces interact and exert influence on agrifood sustainability. 
Various actors situated along global supply chains determine the opportunities and constraints 
for a sustainability transformation of the system, today (Oosterveer 2007). The ability of public 
actors to govern the food system has decreased in the course of globalization, while private 
actors are taking an increasingly powerful position. Still, both actors play a pivotal role in 
agrifood governance. While governments have the capacity to determine trade rules, agricultural 
subsidies or market access, private actors influence this public regulation in their interest or 
create self-set rules and standards (Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Fulponi 2006). Partly as a response, 
new social movements concerned about the environmental and social implications of the 
agrifood system have emerged and try to influence governance towards a sustainable system. 
The interplay between these various types of actors results in an opaqueness of today’s agrifood 
system, which is further enhanced by the simultaneous existence of governance activities at 
various levels. Importantly, the different levels of governance cannot be assigned individually to 
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different types of actors. While one tends to think of agrifood corporations as global actors and 
civil society actors as representing the local level, reality is much more complex. This can be 
more easily observed in the case of civil society actors, where NGOs such as Greenpeace or 
Oxfam are known to pursue their goals and ideas across borders and at all levels of governance. 
Large business actors, however, can also come to play the role of ‘local actors’. In India, for 
instance, global retail chains have found it extremely difficult to get market access and Indian 
retail chains dominate the market. Even if the latter do not represent ‘local’ forces, as one would 
associate them with the village level, the role of such national or even regional (sub-national) 
retail chains needs to be examined in the interplay of local and global forces. Consequently, any 
analysis of the forces shaping the sustainability of the agrifood system needs to pay attention to 
the intricacies of the interaction of different global and local forces.  
When aiming to understand these forces, most importantly, we need to understand their sources 
of power. This framework article and special section argue that both material and ideational 
sources of power and their interaction are crucial determinants of actors’ capabilities in shaping 
agrifood sustainability. Specifically, we postulate that actors can draw on actor-specific and 
structural material sources of power as well as activate and shape ideational sources of power in 
the form of knowledge and legitimacy in pursuit of their interests in agrifood governance. Earlier 
studies have focused on actors’ ability to exercise power according to their material resources 
such as the distribution of economic or technological resources, largely emphasizing the role of 
corporate concentration (Lang 2003; MacMillan 2005). Other scholars have emphasized the 
ideational dimension of power such as legitimacy or cultural embeddedness as relevant for the 
shaping of the agrifood system, so as in marketing strategies (Fennell 2009), discursive power 
(Holzscheiter 2005) or indigenous knowledge (Shiva 2001). Only few studies have looked at the 
connection of material and ideational sources of power in empirical research on the global 
agrifood system so far, however (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Furthermore, only few case studies 
with a structured assessment of the power play between global and local forces in agrifood 
governance exist that could help us broaden our knowledge on the interaction of these forces.  
Empirically, the special section focuses on the case of India. India’s role in the agrifood system 
is a particularly interesting one and it is not surprising, that India has inspired case study research 
on agrifood issues (Krishna and Qaim 2007; Neilson and Pritchard 2007). As a large producer 
and consumer of food products, and with a significant share of its own population facing a 
precarious food situation, India is fascinating from different perspectives of analysis. 
Sustainability is an issue with regard to food security and safety, as well as environmental and 
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social well-being. In addition, the interaction between different types of actors and various levels 
of governance is particularly pronounced in India. The interaction of global and local forces 
seems to be especially vibrant in the Indian case and promises fascinating insights on its impact 
on agrifood governance. Analyses with a common analytical approach have been rare, so a 
structured case-study research will deliver further knowledge on India’s agrifood system.  
In sum, this special section devotes itself to a systematic study of material and ideational sources 
of power and their shaping of agrifood governance, specifically the sustainability of agrifood 
governance in India. Sharing a common analytical framework, all articles in the special section 
analyze crucial aspects of food governance and power with respect to different cases of food 
governance in India. Thereby, we hope to provide new insights that will move the debates on 
power in the global agrifood system and its sustainability transformation ahead. 
This article lays out the analytical framework for the section. It identifies different material and 
ideational sources of power and their interaction as important determinants of the ability of 
global and local forces to influence agrifood governance and thereby shape agrifood 
sustainability. In a second step, the article applies this framework to the empirical case of 
‘Golden Rice’ as an example of contests around GM food in India. The article concludes with an 
outlook for the special section.  
 
II. Analytical Framework 
An analytical framework for analyzing power relations and the role of global and local forces in 
the global agrifood system is faced by the problem that the existing theoretical approaches either 
have tended to focus on the exercise of power by actors or the power of structures. Numerous 
scholars have criticized the theoretical limitations inherent in this agent-structure differentiation 
and called for an integrative framework that looks at the interaction and relation of different 
types of power. In this respect, Barnett and Duvall (2006) remind us of the frequently made 
distinction between the two possible ways power can be exercised: ‘Power over’ refers to 
actions, where actors are able to exercise control over others, while ‘power to’ points to social 
relations of constitution that define actors as well as their capacities and resources. This 
conceptual distinction is especially useful when looking at the diverse composition of the global 
agrifood system, where a sole focus on actors’ power hides the structural forces that influence an 
actor’s role and choice set. Simultaneously, a focus on the influences of structures would neglect 
the agency exercised by actors in shaping the system and its structures. The mutual constitution 
of social structures and actors in the global agrifood system, then, points to the benefits of a 
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framework that distinguishes and integrates different dimensions of power. Such a perspective 
enables the analysis to include the relevant plethora of (in)visible forces and their interactions, as 
well as their sources of power. Accordingly, we develop a framework that emphasizes the impact 
of material and ideational, actor-specific and structural sources of power and their interaction on 
the ability of actors to influence agrifood governance.  
 
Material Sources of Power 
According to some scholars, material dimensions of power are considered to be the foundation of 
most political activities. When we consider state and non-state actors, we find material power to 
be made up of capabilities grounded in the economic realm such as finance, information, and 
technology. These material capabilities, then, influence actors’ strategic options both on the input 
and output side of political processes (Fuchs 2007).  
Material sources of power can be of an actor-specific or of a structural nature. They entail the 
financial means actors have at their disposal, as well as the structural power they can exercise by 
foreclosing certain political options of other actors. The actor specific dimension of material 
power can be approached via an assessment of resources, which may be transformed into 
influence. Financial means are frequently considered an important material source of power, as 
they are highly fungible and can be easily converted into political activities. Financial means not 
only can allow political influence via direct campaign or party donations, but also allow actors to 
hire professional lobbyists and PR consultants or to be present at multiple sites and levels of 
governance simultaneously, for instance. The increasing dependence of political decision makers 
on funding as well as external expertise has improved interest groups’ access to politicians and 
bureaucrats and enhanced the prominence of this aspect of actors’ material power (ibid.). There 
is a huge gap between different non-state actors with regard to the financial means, on which 
these political activities rely, however. While many corporate actors have been able to draw on 
large financial resources in pursuit of their political interests, most civil society actors tend not to 
have the same capacities at disposal.  
Taking the structural material sources of power into account means to pay attention to the 
influence of production and consumption processes on the power of actors. Specifically, market 
power is an important source of structural material power. In the narrow sense, such market 
control reflects economic power. This economic power is translated into political power, 
however, as soon as market control is paired with agenda-setting activities affecting the wider 
public. Thus, structural material power is reflected in the ability of transnational corporations 
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(TNCs) to shape political agendas, due to the dependence of political elites on the provision of 
jobs and investments by the private sector. It shows up in the corporate ability to predetermine 
the behavioural options of political decision makers by excluding certain issues from the political 
agenda (Cox 1981; Fuchs 2007, 58).  
In the agrifood sector, structural material power arising from monopolistic and oligopolistic 
market settings is omnipotent. More than 80 percent of the global markets in wheat, corn, coffee, 
cocoa or tea are each controlled by just three corporations (Deutscher Bundestag 2002). 
Similarly, the GMO sector is notorious for its level of capital concentration and the market share 
of one corporation in particular. Similarly, capital concentration has significantly increased in 
food retailing, thereby bringing oligopolistic structures to this section of the supply chain as well 
(Burch and Lawrence 2007; Reardon and Berdegué 2006). This last development shows that 
power contests may well exist between different corporate actors at different places in the supply 
chain, of course, and not just between corporate actors and governments or civil society.  
At the same time, consumers have structural material power in the form of market power as well. 
After all, consumer demand (especially from industrialized countries) can shape global economic 
flows and the associated allocation of value in the global agrifood system. This structural power 
of consumers should not be overestimated, however, as it only exists to a notable degree on 
occasions, in which a very large number of consumers share preferences and/or act in a similar 
manner. Only under such conditions may consumers challenge the market power of business 
actors. Moreover, information asymmetries in a global economy based on the distancing of 
production and consumption, as pointed out above, constrain consumer power dramatically. 
Importantly, material structures do not only provide actors with agenda-setting power (i.e., the 
ability to bring about or prevent decisions by others), they may also place them in the position to 
make decisions themselves (i.e. replace those holding the formal decision making power). In 
today's globalized world, economic and institutional structures, processes, and interdependencies 
mean that actors in control of pivotal networks and resources have the capacity to adopt, 
implement, and enforce rules with an obligatory quality and distributional consequences for 
other actors as well. Thus, the traditional notion of structural power needs to be extended. Rather 
than merely providing indirect agenda-setting power, structural contexts may also endow actors 
with direct rule-setting power.2 This acquisition of rule-setting power by non-state actors, in 
particular corporations, is reflected in private governance initiatives, in which de jure voluntary 
                                                 
2
 Note, however, that an overlap between agenda-setting power and rule-setting power exists in so far as agendas are 
about rules. 
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standards set by agrifood corporations become de facto mandatory for suppliers due to the 
corporations’ market control (Fuchs 2007).  
 
Ideational Sources of Power 
Material resources only have limited explanatory power as long as the political process and the 
translation of these resources into political influence are not considered. It is important to keep in 
mind that it is not the mere size of material resources, but the ability to successfully convert them 
into advocacy tools, which determine actor-specific material power (ibid., 82). Thus, actors with 
relatively less material resources may be able to exert more power due to the pairing of material 
and ideational power, for instance. Next to material sources, then, ideational sources of power 
need to be investigated Looking at ideational sources of power highlights that actors can draw on 
the symbolic meaning of social practices and institutions in their exercise of power, thereby 
enabling and constraining behaviour and action. A focus on ideational sources of power stresses 
the normative dimension as a nonmaterial power resource and identifies an actor’s ability to 
influence the framing of political issues as a crucial asset. This “third face of power” (Lukes 
2005) points to the discursive power an actor can exercise on the definition of policies, actors, 
and norms and procedures.. This perspective highlights that via the exercise of discursive power, 
actors can organize “some definitions of issues […] into politics while other definitions are 
organized out” (Hajer 1995, 42).  
It is difficult to assess the characteristics of this subtle form of power, however. Koller traces its 
exercise through norms, ideas and societal institutions and maps it in culture, discourse, and 
communicative practices (Koller 1991). But since any communication includes both intentional 
and unintentional messages, the recognition and assessment of intent and agency becomes 
particularly difficult. After all, actors are objects as well as subjects in discourse (Fuchs 2005). 
Thus, while (some) norms can be manipulated by actors, others structure social relations so 
deeply that they may shape actors’ identities, perceptions, and behavioural options more than the 
actors are able to shape them.  
When analyzing ideational power, one of the crucial aspects to consider is authority. Following 
Arendt, we define authority as legitimate force.3 The ability of actors to influence discourses is 
closely linked to perceptions of their legitimacy, as it requires trust in the potential validity of 
messages. Public actors obtain political legitimacy through formal electoral processes, while 
                                                 
3
 Along the same lines, Cutler, Haufler and Porter conceptualize private authority as “decision-making power over 
an issue area that is generally regarded as legitimate by participants” (Cutler et al. 1999, 362). 
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non-state actors’ legitimacy tends to derive from public trust in actor’s expertise and/or 
willingness to represent the public interest (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010). The authority and 
legitimacy of NGOs, in particular, originates in ideal-type assumptions on their non-profit-
oriented and non-violent aims (Holzscheiter 2005, 726). But even business actors’ political 
authority has benefited from a public change in attitudes toward market actors and increasing 
public confidence in their problem-solving ability since the rise of neoliberalism (Fuchs 2007). 
In addition, business has also actively tried to improve on its moral sources of legitimacy with 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) activities. At the same time, non-state actors such as 
NGOs use discursive strategies in the form of ‘naming’, ‘framing’, and ‘shaming’ to create 
pressure and negative publicity in order to delegitimize business or public authority (Arts 2003; 
Holzscheiter 2005).  
The legitimacy of actors and ideas is embedded in social structures, in turn. As pointed out 
above, the political legitimacy of private actors has varied with changes in the Zeitgeist as well 
as efforts by actors to shape their public image. Likewise, the legitimacy of particular policy 
options is linked to their fit with dominant societal norms and may be enhanced or reduced 
through the framing of a given policy option in terms of such norms. In the agrifood system, the 
norms of food security or food safety represent potentially powerful norms (Phillips and Wolfe 
2001). Similarly, we can identify democratic ideals and market logic as two normative 
approaches contesting each other in global agrifood governance: 
“The history of food governance can usefully be understood as a long struggle between two 
conflicting forces: ’food democracy‘ and ’food control‘: the latter suggests relatively few people 
exerting power to shape the food supply; the policy framework is dirigiste; decisions are ’top-down‘ 
[…] ’Food democracy‘, on the other hand, gives scope for a more inclusive approach to food policy. 
Its ethos is ‘bottom-up’, considering the diversity of views and interests in the mass of the population 
and food supply chain […].” (Lang and Heasman 2004, 279) 
Norms are always contested, then. Yet, the activation of attractive norms can provide an 
important source of power to actors in pursuit of their political strategies. 
Another important dimension of ideational power is knowledge, which refers to the processing 
of information. Paying attention to the social construction of knowledge means recognizing that 
what is perceived as objective knowledge, as fact and truth, is actually formed and shaped by 
different actors’ communications and the strategic issuance of information. Today, the 
complexity of political decisions increasingly requires highly specialized knowledge, “and those 
who control this knowledge have considerable power” (Nelkin 1975, 37). Policymakers 
increasingly rely on non-state actors’ specialized knowledge and information, which gives them 
an incentive to involve especially business actors and NGOs in the policy making process.  
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Next to economic and technological information, scientifically based knowledge seems to have a 
strong power of interpretation in the public debate, which results from a generally positive 
perception of scientific expertise and objectivity. The readiness to accept expert knowledge and 
award scientific knowledge extensive authority is comparatively high among public and private 
actors. However, one may well want to question whether matters concerning science and 
technology in the decision-making process can in fact be apolitical and simply rely on an 
‘objective’ specialized knowledge of experts, of course. Still, it is an important source of power, 
on which actors can draw. 
The Interaction between Material and Ideational Sources of Power 
Material and ideational power do not exist independent of each other, but reveal a high grade of 
interaction. Two pivotal modes of interaction exist: access and reconstitution. Access as a mode of 
interaction manifests itself firstly in organizational terms and highlights the ability to gain access 
to political decision-making bodies. The extent to which actors gain access to material structures 
of governance depends on their resources as well as the perceived political legitimacy of these 
actors and their resources. Secondly, access to knowledge emphasises that material sources allow 
actors to fund research, or pay for conferences and publications. Thereby, they greatly facilitate 
both the gathering and the communication of knowledge. As knowledge is not an objective item, 
as pointed out above, the ability to determine which questions are being asked and which results 
are being communicated (and how), certainly adds to an actor’s power in today’s world.  
As a related matter, the issue of reconstitution also stresses that the success of narratives and 
storylines can be influenced by the repetitiveness, with which corresponding messages are sent. 
In the era of mediatised politics, then, financial resources can be used to strengthen one’s 
preferred ideas and norms or weaken competing ones. Costly PR strategies and media campaigns 
advantage actors with large financial resources relative to those without (Fuchs 2005). Noelle-
Neumann (1996) speaks of the existence of a Schweigespirale in the presence of communicative 
asymmetry and studies show that even the new telecommunication technologies and channels 
worldwide are used primarily for private economic interests (Reljić 2001). In this context, one 
has to ask how public the public debate really is. 
In other words, neither the material nor the ideational sources of power should be considered just 
by themselves. There is always an interaction between them. These interaction processes may be 
particularly difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, the reinforcement and reconstitution of each other 
are too important for the shaping of power relations to ignore them. Consequently, this 
framework proposes to analyze power relations according to the material and ideational 
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dimensions of actors’ power and their interaction on the local and global levels of governance 
(see table 1). The explanatory power of this framework will be illustrated in a next step with the 
help of the example of GMO politics and more precisely ‘Golden Rice’ in India. 
 
 
Table 1: Material and ideational determinants of power 
 
III. ‘Golden Rice’ and contests around GM-food in India 
The protracted introduction and heated discussions about the costs and benefits of 
‘Golden Rice’ in India provide an excellent example of political contests around the introduction 
and diffusion of biotechnology in the agricultural sector, in which a range of actors and norms 
clash. ’Golden Rice’ was invented in 1999 with the expressed aim of combating malnutrition and 
especially vitamin A-deficiency (VAD) and got its name from yellow coloured rice grains that 
resulted out of the production of beta-carotene. As we show below, the case of ‘Golden Rice’ 
reveals the crucial role ideational dimensions of power play in agrifood governance. This does 
not mean that ideational power generally is more important than material power. Rather, the case 
does show that under certain conditions material power by itself is not sufficient.  
‘Golden Rice’ provides a particularly interesting example of GMO politics. First, the 
large corporations in control of the global market appear to have no direct economic interest in 
introducing this product. Companies that owned a large share of the Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), which were relevant for the development of ‘Golden Rice’, have donated their patents to 
the Golden Rice Humanitarian Project to allow a ‘freedom-to-operate’ for humanitarian purposes 
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in developing countries. Thus, the main proponents of ‘Golden Rice’ have been public actors and 
scientists.  
Secondly, ‘Golden Rice’ has proven to be highly controversial in its introduction. India as 
a rice-based society with a large agricultural sector, which already produces GMOs, could be 
expected to be interested in this new rice technology. Indeed, India’s state owned research labs 
have been conducting substantial research on ‘Golden Rice’. But more than a decade after its 
initial intervention, the bio-engineered rice is still not available, despite the corporate donations 
of the IPRs. This raises the question, why the introduction of ‘Golden Rice’ has been protracted 
in India and how this development can be explained along a material and ideational power 
framework. 
Typically, a discussion of the material dimension of power in GMO governance will 
point out that the global market for GMOs is characterized by an oligopolistic if not 
monopolistic market structure. Large biotech corporations do not only command huge financial 
resources, they also own most of the technology and information needed to conduct GMO 
research. Such an analysis would then highlight that the ‘other side’ of GMO politics is made up 
of millions of small farmers with little individual power and control. For India specifically, one 
would also point out that the comparatively weak financial situation of these millions of farmers 
is worsened by the fact that the rural poor have little access to credit. 
However, the discrepant distribution of material power between corporations and other 
actors in the agribiotech sector appears to be less important in this case. Initial development of 
‘Golden Rice’ was not founded in the private agribiotech sector that dominates the market.4 
Rather it has been promoted by public actors, including governmental actors, supranational 
organizations, civil society actors such as large foundations, and scientists. Especially public 
funding bodies and private foundations were involved in sponsoring the ‘Golden Rice’ project. 
Clearly, material resources by public or civil society actors can also represent material power in 
the political process. Thus, they could be juxtaposed to the material power resources of the 
farmers just as corporate ones. In the case of ‘Golden Rice’, however, these material sources are 
not sufficient for explaining the protraction in its adoption. After all, the material power scale is 
highly tilted in favour of the actors promoting the development and introduction of the crop. 
                                                 
4 Note that Potrykus, the original inventor, initially approached Nestlé, the world’s biggest food company, for 
funding, who were not interested in the project. Later, Potrykus stated that this rejection was ”fortunate” since it 
allowed public funding for the Golden Rice project (Potrykus 2001).  
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Indeed, the governance of ‘Golden Rice’ probably can best be comprehended in terms of 
its ideational power contests. In the discourse on ‘Golden Rice’, norms emphasizing traditional 
values and knowledge such as community control and shared knowledge have prevailed over 
ideas of technological progress and specialised knowledge. Opponents of ‘Golden Rice’ have 
even successfully used ‘anti-corporate’ shaming strategies, although corporate interests were 
present in the political contests only indirectly.  
In an abstract field such as biotechnology, laymen tend to put considerable trust in 
scientific expertise. Especially in India, “the concept of science […] is that of the ultimate key to 
all problems facing the country, […] scientists can lay claims to the charisma which in some 
other political cultures belongs exclusively to god-king” (Nandy 1990, 8). This furthers the 
strategic usage of scientific arguments by actors involved in GMO politics: “MNCs, Indian 
corporates, industry lobbyists, governments, international agencies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and farmers movements all claim […] ’science’ to be on their side“ 
(Seshia and Scoones 2003, 2). In the case of ‘Golden Rice’, however, opponents have also 
questioned the use of ‘science’. While proponents have declared ‘Golden Rice’ a rational and 
scientifically based technical solution to food security, critics have argued that it is a 
‘technological fix’, which ignores existing conventional solutions to vitamin A deficiency 
(Greenpeace 2005; Shiva 2000). 
Next to scientific expertise, actors in the political contest have tried to gain legitimacy for 
their perspective by relating it to religious or national ideas and symbols. Thus, proponents have 
tried to link the project to religious actors and symbols, such as the inventor’s meeting with the 
pope or bible citations in a pro-‘Golden Rice’ conference report (The Bertebos Foundation 
2008). However, critics have successfully challenged this presentation of the technology by 
defining GMO politics as a threat to Indian identity and the national interest (Assadi 2008). 
Based on a Gandhian anti-colonialist perspective, for instance, Indian critics have used 
‘shaming’ and ‘naming’ activities to keep up a threat of Western corporate control over seeds. 
Although the IPRs of ‘Golden Rice’ have been donated, the framing of GMO politics as a case 
of postcolonial dependency has still been able to strongly influence the contest and challenge the 
legitimacy of Western foundations and religious actors.  
Agricultural biotechnology is based on highly specialized knowledge. In the political 
contests on ‘Golden Rice’, this technological knowledge has been contrasted with traditional and 
indigenous knowledge about agricultural practices, for instance (Shiva 2000). Importantly, the 
traditional free exchange of seeds among farmers reflects valuations of certain types of 
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knowledge related to culture and heritage and is an essential component of Indian people’s 
livelihoods in rural areas (Gold 2003; Shiva 2000). 
When it comes to the interaction between material and ideational sources of power, we 
can identify the role of access and reconstitution in the contest on ‘Golden Rice’ as well. 
Importantly, ideational sources of power have played a powerful role even in this interaction due 
to the characteristics of the contest. Access, for instance, has been strongly driven not just by 
money, but by the Indian tradition of a strong civil society, rural practices of shared knowledge, 
and high suspicion of corporate control. Likewise, the role of reconstitution has to be evaluated 
against the background of the tight networks existing in this society, especially in rural areas. 
Access to knowledge tends to play a core role in agricultural biotechnology since the 
protection of technological knowledge by patents on living organisms restricts access. Today, 
five major groups of large agribiotech companies control access to most of the technology that is 
needed to do commercial research on GM crops (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2004, 86). As 
pointed out above, however ‘Golden Rice’ poses an unusual example in agricultural 
biotechnology development in so far as the original inventors of ‘Golden Rice’, transferred all 
rights to Syngenta (formerly AstraZeneca), who donated all legal rights to the Golden Rice 
Humanitarian Board to allow a ‘freedom-to-operate’ in developing countries (Al-Babili and 
Beyer 2005, 569).5 According to the partnership, Syngenta retains all the rights for the 
commercialization of Golden Rice (in the developed world), but seeds are made freely available 
to farmers and traders that earn below US$ 10,000 a year (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2004, 
37). Moreover, ‘Golden Rice’ was further developed at a public research institute, as pointed out 
above.6 Yet, the concept of patenting and restrictions in access to knowledge does present an 
important link between material and ideational dimensions of power even in this case. Indeed, 
some even call the ‘Golden Rice’ project a strategy of the private sector to enhance its legitimacy 
and the legitimacy of agricultural biotechnology as such. In a foreword to the seminal Science 
article on ‘Golden Rice’, Guerinot stated that “[o]ne can only hope that this application of plant 
genetic engineering to ameliorate human misery without regard to short-term profit will restore 
this technology to political acceptability” (Guerinot 2000, 243). Once this legitimacy is achieved 
                                                 
5
 ‘Golden Rice’ may also have been an easy choice for corporate actors in this respect, as its commercial value is 
questionable. Syngenta itself states that it “has no commercial interest in the use of Golden Rice in developing 
countries and does not foresee a commercial market for Golden Rice in developed countries” (Syngenta Homepage 
2010). 
6
 Nevertheless, there were some 70 IPRs belonging to 32 different companies and universities that needed to be 
licensed (Kryder et al. 2000; Potrykus 2001, 8). 
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through positive publicity and public acceptance, access to the market may be more easily gained 
(Bisserbe 2008).  
The interaction between material and ideational power when it comes to access to 
knowledge, furthermore, does not only provide a potential source of power but also can serve to 
raise the legitimacy challenges faced by GMO technology. Shiva, for instance, has emphasised 
the threat of the marginalization of indigenous knowledge structures such as the tradition of 
sharing seeds (Shiva 2001, 14), which stands in direct conflict with IPR protected rice varieties. 
Even if ‘Golden Rice’ itself is supposed to become freely available and knowledge of the 
technology can be exchanged, the question remains if an IPR based technology can be easily 
introduced into a context, where local seed cultivation and access to this knowledge has a long 
tradition. 
As pointed out above, access, as a result of the interaction between material and 
ideational sources of power, also has a second important form: access to institutions and the 
‘official’ political debate. This access, in turn, is not just a function of material resources but also 
of the legitimacy of the actors involved as well as their resources. In the case of ‘Golden Rice’, 
one of the particular strengths of its opponents has been their perceived legitimacy. First, India 
has a strong civil society tradition, where the voice of the public just cannot be ignored easily. 
Secondly, some very prominent representatives of this civil society were at the forefront of the 
political contest and their perceived legitimacy as political voices makes it difficult to bar them 
from the political debate. 
The second important interaction between material and ideational sources of power, 
reconstitution, can be witnessed in the discursive battle for the hearts and minds of the Indian 
public and especially farmers. Again, however, material sources of power have not been able to 
determine this contest. Economically strong actors have invested in PR strategies to enhance 
their legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the technology. Thus, the promoters of ‘Golden 
Rice’ have pursued far-reaching media campaigns that enabled them to disseminate a 
legitimizing discourse of humanitarian necessity, and to advocate it as a rational scientific 
solution to a global problem. While NGOs and Indian activist networks have not had the same 
financial means as corporations or governments, however, their tight and far reaching networks 
in Indian civil society combined with their perceived legitimacy have helped them gain and 
maintain a strong voice in the public and political debate. Together with GM-critically scientists, 
they thereby have been able to challenge the proposed benefits of ‘Golden Rice’ and introduce a 
strong critical account of it.  
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In sum, the long battle over the adoption of ‘Golden Rice’ in India can best be understood 
on the basis of the ideational contests associated with it. To date, the framing as a scientific 
necessity and moral obligation has not been able to overcome traditional societal values and 
knowledge structures and a specific Indian postcolonial perspective. The analysis clearly 
delineates the limits to the influence of material sources of power in the context of issues 
associated with high levels of conflict over legitimacy claims. 
 
IV. Outlook 
The special section aims to fill a significant gap in the study of power in the agrifood system and 
its implications for governance and sustainability. It pursues a systematic analysis of the role of 
global and local actors in the agrifood system, highlighting the important interaction of material 
and ideational dimensions of power. The contribution of the articles to the state of knowledge is 
multifaceted. They address issues of the globalization of agriculture and food, with a specific 
focus on the role of global and local actors in shaping the agriculture and food sector. The 
articles particularly investigate the linkage between power plays in agrifood governance and 
sustainability, thereby relating to questions of well-being, food safety and food security in the 
agriculture and food sector, in a variety of settings and levels. The articles also further our 
understanding of the agrifood system in India, which is of particular concern due to its important 
role in the global agrifood system as a major producer and consumer of agrifood products and a 
country which combines characteristics of rapid economic growth and wealthy sectors of the 
population with a continued struggle to feed its population.  
While this article has laid out the analytical framework and applied it to a first empirical case of 
agrifood governance in India, the following articles add pieces to the mosaic by analysing a 
diverse set of additional cases. The article by Aarti Gupta focuses on the different political and 
discursive conflicts that impact risk governance in India, while Tilman Altenburg evaluates 
different patterns of value chain governance of biodiesel according to interests, ideas and power 
relations of stakeholders. The article by Dominic Glover, then, examines the System of Rice 
Intensification (SRI) and the relationship between formal scientific expertise and informal, 
practical know-how. Finally, Markus Lederer returns to the theoretical questions and provides a 
closing commentary on the role of global and local forces in agrifood governance. 
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